I. Introduction
External financial conditions provide the backdrop to domestic financial conditions, especially when the domestic banking system is open to funding from cross-border banks.
An IMF report on capital flows (IMF (2011) Source: IMF (2011, p.14) The distinguishing feature of the credit boom that preceded the global financial crisis of 2007-9 is the role played by banking sector inflows. In contrast Korea has been vulnerable to "twin crises" in which a banking crisis and currency crisis reinforce each other. Although twin crises show many different forms across countries and across time, the common thread that links them is the balance sheet mismatch at the aggregate economy level arising from excessive short-term debt denominated in foreign currency.
In this paper, we explore the extent to which the build-up of short-term foreign currency of the banking sector can be attributed to the currency hedging activity firms who seek to reduce the risks arising from currency movements. For the case of Korea, we present estimates for the period up to the 2008 crisis that suggest that the build-up of foreign currency liabilities of the banking sector can be attributed in large part to such currency hedging activity.
In Korea's case, the vulnerability to reversals of capital flows owes in large part to the currency hedging need of exporting companies, since exporting companies acquire long-term dollar receivables through their export orders, and then wish to hedge the currency exposure until receiving final payment in dollars.
Hedging takes the form of selling dollars forward to banks in Korea. However, the counterparty to the forward transaction (the bank) must then hedge its own long dollar exposure, which they do by borrowing in dollars, and then investing the proceeds in Korean won.
Hedging is a desirable activity from the point of view of each individual firm undertaking the hedging operation, but may entail a collective outcome where the financial system is left vulnerable to a sudden shift in external financial conditions, especially from a sudden reversal of capital inflows as was experienced in 2008.
In this paper, we review the rationale for an institution -dubbed the
Exchange Stabilization and Guarantee Corporation (ESGC) -which can provide -4-
the public good of providing hedging services to individual firms, but which does not have the harmful side-effect of generating short-term foreign currency liabilities that lie at the heart of the vulnerability of an economy to financial shocks.
Three features of the ESGC enable such a role. First, it is fully equity-financed, rather than debt-financed like a bank. Second, its valuation gains and losses are evaluated in US dollars, rather than in Korean won. Third, the ESGC is allowed to hold a portfolio of both US dollar-denominated and Korean won-denominated assets. As we describe in more detail below, these three features allow the ESGC to maintain a fully hedged position in the face of currency movements by switching between assets in different currencies while balance sheet size is fixed. This is in contrast to banks, who hedge their currency exposure by expanding the balance sheet by taking on more short-term dollar denominated debt. The hedging operations of the ESGC are very simple one-off transactions, rather than involving dynamic hedging techniques.
Our paper is intended as a contribution to discussions about the principles underlying longer-term financial resilience, rather than about short-term crisis management policies in the light of current financial developments. As such, more detailed research and study on feasibility of the ESGC would be needed before it can be put in place.
II. Background
Before sketching the details of the institutional design, we first review evidence on the spillovers of hedging activity and how such spillovers undermine systemic stability. consisting of customer deposits were adequate in funding total lending, so that the loan to deposit ratio was below 1. However, lending outstripped deposits in the period leading up to the Lehman crisis, and banks resorted increasingly to noncore funding, especially the non-core funding in foreign currency as seen in Figure   3 . Figure 5 shows the contrast in the pattern of capital inflows and outflows for two sectors -the equity sector and the banking sector. The banking sector saw very substantial capital outflows from Korea. Although Korean banks also held dollar claims, such as the long dollar forward positions on Korean corporations, such assets were not usable to meet maturing dollar liabilities without exacerbating the economy-wide liquidity crisis. Nonfinancial firms in Korea had dollar receivables, such as the receivables of the shipbuilders, but they were long-term dollar receivables that could not be realized immediately.
Korea's vulnerability to currency crises arises from the large hedging need of exporting companies. Since the exporting companies acquire long-term dollar receivables through their export orders, they wish to hedge the currency risk by selling dollars forward.
Figure 5: Net capital flows in equity sector and in banking sector foreign currency liabilities Source: Bank of Korea and Hahm, Mishkin, Shin and Shin (2010) The banking sector in Korea (including the foreign bank branches) has been the counterparty, buying the forward dollars sold by the exporters. However, the counterparty to the forward transaction (the bank) must then hedge its long dollar exposure. The bank can hedge is long dollar position by borrowing in dollars, and then investing the proceeds in Korean Won, thereby hedging the long dollar forward position with a carry trade position in the Korean Won.
-8-By hedging the exchange rate risk in these long-term dollar receivables, the exporting companies could transfer to the banking sector the long-term dollar claims, but the banks then would engage in maturity transformation by borrowing short in dollars.
In this way, the overall currency mismatch on the consolidated balance sheet consisting of the corporate and banking sectors could be eliminated through the hedging activity, a maturity mismatch between long-term dollar claims and short-term dollar liabilities took its place. In effect, the currency mismatch was replaced by a maturity mismatch which left the Korean financial system vulnerable to the global financial crisis in 2008 that followed in the wake of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The bank can hedge the currency risk by borrowing in dollars and holding the proceeds in Korean won by purchasing local assets, or by entering into a hedging transaction of its own with another bank in Korea. However, in aggregate, the banking sector in Korea will have the form depicted in Figure 6 , where the long dollar forward position is offset by a "carry trade" position that funds the purchase of local Korean assets with short-term dollar liabilities. Figure 4 refers to the "banking sector inside Korea" in order to highlight the role of foreign bank branches that operate in Korea. As shown in Figure 4 , the foreign bank branches had larger outstanding amounts of short term foreign currency denominated liabilities in the run-up to the 2008 crisis.
III. Banking Sector Foreign Currency Liabilities due to Hedging Activity
The main findings from a survey conducted jointly by the Bank of Korea and the as a press release (Bank of Korea (2008)). This survey found that in the nine months from January to September 2007, 67% of the receivables of exporting companies in Korea were hedged for currency risk, while only 15% of the future orders of importing companies were hedged. The asymmetry between the large hedging activity of the exporters and the relatively much smaller hedging activity of the importers created the preconditions for a mismatch in the demand and supply of long-dated dollars, with supply outstripping demand. Of the importing firms in Korea, the hedging by the petroleum refining sector and the steel sector were found to be particularly low, at only 2 ~ 6% of total orders.
The imbalance in the hedging activity of the exporting and importing sectors reflect both the nature of the goods involved and also the market structure in Korea. The receivables of exporting companies tend to be medium to longer term, involving large indivisible items typified by shipping orders. In contrast, importing companies liabilities are short-term and relatively easier to predict. Moreover, the market power of companies in the importing sectors in the domestic Korean market enables them to pass on any cost increases resulting exchange rate changes on to the final consumer. The same is not true of exporting companies who face relatively stiffer competition in global markets.
In addition to the hedging activity of Korean exporting companies, another important source of hedging activity in the run-up to the 2008 crisis came from the asset management sector in Korea. The asset management sector includes both stock mutual funds serving retail investors, as well as institutional investors in the insurance and pension sector. In practice, the currency hedging by asset managers took the form of selling forward contracts in dollars to banks, in a similar way to the hedging transaction of the exporting firms shown in Figure 6 . In one respect, however, the hedging demand from the asset management sector was more sensitive to market conditions than for the exporting sector in Korea. The reason is that hedging of currency risk for foreign equity holdings entails marking to market the outstanding stock at any moment in time, so that changes in market prices and the exchange rate entails shifts in the hedging need. A buoyant stock market when prices are rising entails hedging demand that applies to the whole outstanding amount, rather than just the new flows that are generated in each time period. and asset managers, we can calculate the approximate amount of the foreign currency liabilities of the banking sector that can be attributed to the hedging activity of the exporters and asset managers, and is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 is the new orders of shipbuilding firms in Korea, while the seventh row of Table 1 shows the net increase in the value of foreign stock holdings of domestic investors.
Starting with these series, we can then estimate the increase in banking sector foreign currency debt that is attributable to the respective hedging activities. Consider first the hedging activity by shipbuilders. For shipbuilders, we have both the series for new orders and the purchase of dollar forwards by the sector (first and third rows of Table 1 ). We then net out the settlement of maturing forward dollar contracts (fourth row) to calculate the net new sales of dollar forward contracts by the shipbuilding sector. Figure 9 plots the series associated with hedging activity of the shipbuilders. The banking sector is on the other side of these sales, and hence accumulates long positions in dollar forwards. The banks then hedge their own exposure by taking on dollar liabilities which in turn are used to purchase local assets. However, the hedging activity by the banks does not translate into a one-for-one increase in foreign exchange liabilities, as the banking sector will have pre-existing foreign currency liabilities which are unrelated to hedging activities by non-banks. In any case, the banks' ability or willingness to bear some currency risk will mean that the increase in foreign currency debt due to its purchase of dollar forwards will not be one-for-one. The Bank of Korea/FSS joint survey (Bank of Korea (2008) ) estimated that that approximately 73% of the shipbuilders new orders were hedged for currency risk by the banking sector. Thus, the estimated increase in the banking sector foreign currency liabilities that is directly attributable to asset managers' hedging activities is given by 0.73 × 0.84 × outstanding foreign equity holding. Figure 11 plots the increase in banking sector foreign currency liabilities attributable to asset managers' hedging activity and adds the analogous series for the foreign currency liabilities arising from shipbuilders' hedging activities. In Figure 12 , we plot our constructed series given by the sum of the two series in Figure 11 (hollow diamonds), and then compare it with the actual increase in banking sector foreign currency liabilities (dark squares). The interaction between hedging activity by non-banks and the banks' own profit incentives is an important potential explanatory factor in the exchange rate dynamics leading up to the 2008 crisis. There is the potential for a feedback loop that links exchange rate movements, hedging demand and exchange rate changes. 
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The feedback loop generated by hedging activity can be depicted as in Figure 13 .
Hedging activity by exporters and asset managers implies sale of forward dollars to banks.
In order to hedge the forward dollars, the banks take on short-term dollar liabilities and The close link between the hedging activities of non-banks with the increase in foreign currency liabilities of the banking sector in Korea holds important lessons for the financial stability implications of real activity. Given the very high economic costs associated with financial crises, we need to take account of the negative spillover effects of the banks' hedging activity using foreign currency liabilities. An institution that can alleviate the negative spillovers of currency hedging activity may enhance system stability. We outline the possible workings of such an institution here. We give it the hypothetical name of the Exchange Stabilization and Guarantee Corporation (ESGC). The purpose of the ESGC is to cut the link between the need for non-banks to hedge their exposures to currency risk and the creation of vulnerabilities to financial stability.
IV. Exchange Stabilization and Guarantee Corporation (ESGC)
The discussion so far has highlighted the double-edged nature of hedging activity.
Hedging is an activity that is privately optimal, but it generates significant negative spillover effects on the broader economy through increased fragility of the financial system and the greater amplification of exchange rate movements. The main channel of the negative spillover is the banking sector's role in being the counterparty to hedgers and the fact that the bank needs to neutralize its own currency mismatch by increasing its foreign currency liabilities. In practice, banks foreign currency liabilities tend to be short term, which exacerbates the fragility of the financial system.
The Exchange Stabilization and Guarantee Corporation (ESGC) is intended as an
alternative to the banking sector whose core role is to be the counterparty to exporters or asset managers who wish to hedge the currency risk. The ESGC would have the following three balance sheet attributes.
 The ESGC is a public entity which is 100 percent equity financed.
 The ESGC is valued in US dollars for computing gains and losses.
 However, the ESGC is permitted to hold Korean won-denominated assets as well as foreign currency denominated assets.
The exact corporate form of the ESGC would depend on governance and accountability imperatives, but its charter and mission would be to promote the public good through enhancing financial stability.
The primary purpose of the ESGC is to play the role of the counterparty to exporting firms or other private sector economic entities who wish to hedge currency risk. The ESGC could also serve a subsidiary role of providing trade finance as part of the currency hedging service to those small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that do not have access to export trade financing, or face high costs of obtaining such funding.
The ESGC would buy dollars forward when an exporter wishes to sell dollars forward. The difference between the ESGC and the banking sector is that the ESGC is fully equity financed. Hence its ability to provide hedging services does not result in the creation of volatile short-term banking sector foreign currency liabilities. In this sense, for every dollar that the ESGC buys from a Korean exporting company, there will be one fewer dollar's worth of short-term bank liability created.
Crucially, the ESGC can hedge its own currency exposure by holding Korean Won assets (such as Korean government bonds or Bank of Korea bonds) but be valued in US dollars. The fact that the ESGC holds Korean won assets but is valued in US dollars creates a natural short-dollar position, which creates the capacity to take on long dollar exposures -for instance, by buying forward dollar positions from Korean exporting companies.
The basic idea can be illustrated in terms of the schematic in Figure 15 , which illustrates the balance sheet of the ESGC at its inception and then after a series of transactions. At its inception, the ESGC holds US dollar assets, such as short-term US Treasury bills. The ESGC is fully equity financed, and valued in dollars. However, because the ESGC is valued in US dollars, the holding of Korean government bonds purchased in this transaction creates an exact hedge for the forward dollar position purchased from the exporter.
In effect, the ESGC's transactions allow it to hold the exact amount of Korean won that is necessary to settle the forward contract with the exporter at the maturity of the contract. The ESGC's obligation to the exporter is to deliver Korean won at the maturity of the forward contract. The ESGC can guarantee that it meets this obligation by securing exactly the right amount of Korean won at the outset and holding the Korean -25-won until maturity. Therefore, the ESGC faces no currency risk during the lifetime of the contract.
Through such adjustments of its asset portfolio, the ESGC creates a short position in the US dollar which exactly offsets the long dollar exposure created by the forward position. However, unlike a bank, the ESGC is fully equity financed, and the vulnerabilities created by short-term foreign currency debt of the banking sector can be avoided. When the forward contract matures, the ESGC reverses the initial set of transactions. When the exporting firm delivers dollars at the maturity date, the ESGC sells Korean won assets and purchases US dollar assets to rebalance its portfolio so that the ESGC remains perfectly hedged against currency fluctuations. In general, the day-to-day operation of the ESGC will entail fine-tuning of the mix of Korean Won and US dollar assets held in its portfolio, in order exactly to offset the long forward dollar position bought from the Korean exporting companies.
It is worth emphasizing the difference between the ESGC and a bank in the way that they manage their balance sheets. For the ESGC, the size of the balance sheet is held fixed, and the hedging is achieved by switching between assets of different currency denomination. In contrast, the bank hedges its currency exposure by expanding its balance sheet by taking on short-term dollar-denominated debt.
Although the currency risk is perfectly hedged through adjustment of the asset portfolio, the ESGC bears some counterparty risk from the possibility that the exporting company is unable to deliver dollars at the maturity date of the forward contract. In order to deal with such counterparty risk, additional safeguards can be put in place. For instance, the counterparty risk could be mitigated by imposing a haircut on the notional value of the forward contract relative to the notarized value of the invoice for the export order, or the collateralization of the forward contract through letters of credit or other securities.
For small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) that are not able to provide such collateral, the credit guarantees that are currently provided by the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) could be used to secure the forward transaction. By combining credit guarantees with its own operations, the ESGC will be able to provide trade financing as well as hedging services, as we will detail below.
To the extent that the ESGC will be operating in the currency forward and swap markets, the broader overall impact of the ESGC's operations on the liquidity and functioning of these markets should be a concern when contemplating the introduction of the ESGC. To the extent that the forward and swap markets are used by diverse financial market participants with differing motives -from purely financial players with speculative motives to non-financial players with hedging motives -the ESGC would be only one of many potential market participants. The ESGC's primary purpose is to stand as a counterparty to exporters and other real sector entities, and so the impact on overall market functioning should be limited, although close monitoring would be necessary to assess the overall impact of the ESGC.
Having outlined the key features of the ESGC, we now provide a more detailed description of its operations through a series of examples. For simplicity of illustration, we assume that the risk-free interest rate for both Korean won and the US dollar is zero.
Example 1: ESGC as counterparty to US dollar forward contract sold by exporter
 Date 0 (initial date): The ESGC has equity of $100 million, and holds $100 million of US treasury bills.
 Date 1 (transactions date):
The exchange rate at the transactions date is 1,000
Korean won for one US dollar. The ESGC conducts two transactions.
o First, the ESGC buys a forward contract from an exporter for the delivery of $1 million at date 2 (the maturity date) in exchange for KRW 1 billion.
o Second, the ESGC sells $1 million worth of dollar-denominated assets and buys KRW 1 billion worth of short-term Korean government bonds.
Through this paired transaction, the ESGC ensures that its value remains at $100 million irrespective of subsequent exchange rate fluctuations. Any gains or losses (in US dollar terms) on its on-balance sheet portfolio of assets are exactly offset by the reverse marked-to-market gains and losses on its off-balance sheet forward position. Notice the crucial importance of valuing gains and losses for the ESGC in US dollars for this immunization property to hold.
 Date 2 (settlement date):
The forward contract matures and settlement takes place.
The exchange rate will have changed from the contract date, but the ESGC can ensure its value remains unchanged after settlement.
o The ESGC sells the KRW 1 billion worth of Korean government bonds on its portfolio, and delivers the won to the exporter, as specified in the forward contract.
o In return, the exporter delivers $1 million dollars to the ESGC, as stipulated in the forward contract. The ESGC then purchases $1 million worth of US dollar safe assets, to bring its on-balance sheet portfolio to $100 million worth of US dollardenominated safe assets.
After the settlement date, the ESGC's balance sheet is back to its initial portfolio.
Provided that counterparty risk can be eliminated, the ESGC's trades enable it to remain perfectly hedged against currency fluctuations between the contract date and the settlement date.
Example 2: ESGC as counterparty to US dollar currency swap
Suppose that a Korean bank wishes to sell a US dollar currency swap contract with face value of $1 million. Suppose that the exchange rate at the transactions date is 1,000
Korean won for one US dollar. Under the swap contract, the Korean bank delivers KRW 1 billion in exchange for $1 million at the contracting date, and receives KRW 1 billion for $1 million at the settlement date (recall that interest rates are zero for illustration). The ESGC can play the counterparty to such a swap as follows.
 Date 1 (transactions date):
o The ESGC delivers $1 million to the bank in exchange for KRW 1 billion as specified in the swap.
o The ESGC conducts no further transactions. The KRW 1 billion proceeds stay on the ESGC's balance sheet until maturity.
In the swap transaction, the ESGC does not adjust its on-balance sheet portfolio of assets. By keeping the KRW 1 billion proceeds on its balance sheet, the ESGC can fully hedge its obligation to deliver Korean won at the settlement date. Notice that any gains or losses on its on-balance sheet portfolio of assets are exactly offset by the reverse markedto-market gains and losses on its off-balance sheet position.
 Date 2 (settlement date): The swap contract matures and settlement takes place.
o The ESGC delivers KRW 1 billion to the Korean bank.
o In return, the Korean bank delivers $1 million dollars to the ESGC.
After the settlement date, the ESGC's balance sheet is back to its initial portfolio, provided that counterparty risk can be eliminated in some other way.
Example 3: ESGC as provider of combined hedging and trade credit services
Suppose that a Korean manufacturing firm from the SME sector wishes to accept an export order for a long-dated project. The project entails significant currency risk but also entails financing needs. The small firm does not have the financing in hand, and lacks collateral for obtaining trade finance from the banking sector.
Under these circumstances, the ESGC can provide a combination of trade financing and currency hedging by working in unison with existing agencies such as the Korea
Credit Guarantee Fund (KODIT) who provide credit guarantees for small and medium sized companies that lack collateral demanded by banks. The ESGC can provide the combination of a loan and a forward contract as depicted in Figure 16 . In this example, the small exporting firm has obtained an export order for $1 million, but also needs to borrow in Korean won for working capital to fulfill the order. Say that the firm needs working capital of 1 billion Korean won, which is exactly equal to the $1 million export order at today's exchange rate of $1 = KRW 1,000.
In this example, the ESGC acts as a discounter of the export invoice. The discounting of receivables is known as "factoring", and the ESGC provides factoring as well hedging services. The specific transactions are as follows.
 Date 1 (transactions date):
o The ESGC sells $1 million and obtains KRW 1 billion. The ESGC lends this sum to the export firm, with promised repayment of 1 billion won at the settlement date. This loan is secured on the export invoice and the credit guarantee from KODIT.
o Simultaneously, the exporting firm enters into a forward contract with the ESGC and sells $1 million forward to the ESGC at today's exchange rate of $1 = KRW 1,000. The forward contract is also guaranteed by KODIT.
Provided that there is no credit risk -either on the loan to the exporting firm, or on the export invoice, the ESGC's claim of 1 billion won exactly offsets the obligation to deliver 1 billion won at the settlement date. Meanwhile, any currency risk is eliminated by the fact that the ESGC expects to receive $1 million at the settlement date. In this way, any gains or losses on its on-balance sheet portfolio of assets are exactly offset by the reverse marked-to-market gains and losses on its off-balance sheet position.
 Date 2 (settlement date): The forward contract matures and settlement takes place. Meanwhile, the export firm receives $1 million from its customer. The final settlement then takes place.
o The export firm receives $1 million from its customer and delivers it to the ESGC.
In return, the ESGC delivers KRW 1 billion to the exporter, as stipulated in the forward contract.
o The export firm uses the 1 billion won to repay the loan of the same amount to the ESGC.
After the settlement date, the ESGC's balance sheet is back to its initial portfolio, provided that counterparty risk can be eliminated through KODIT.
In all the examples sketched above, the main benefit of the ESGC is that every dollar's worth of exposure that is hedged by the ESGC entails one less dollar of short-term foreign currency dollar liabilities of the banking sector. The direct benefit of the ESGC is to reduce the vulnerability of the financial system to crises by reducing short-term foreign currency liabilities of the banking sector. We may also expect additional stabilization effects of the ESGC by mitigating the feedback loop generated by the hedging via the banking sector.
Example 4: ESGC as intermediary
Although the ability of the ESGC to provide hedging services is limited by its capital, one way to increase its overall capacity would be to play the role of a central counterparty in forward transactions between sellers and buyers. Figure 17 illustrates such an example. Due to the potential maturity mismatch between the selling and buying leg of the two forward transactions (exporters have longer-dated needs), the role that the ESGC plays in Figure 17 could not be taken over by a currency futures exchange. Moreover, by playing the role of the central counterparty, the ESGC can reassure both sides of the transaction that the counterparty risk can be minimized.
The central counterparty role of the ESGC could be expected also to contribute to the development of a more active market between sellers and buyers of forwards and thus lowering the costs of hedging both for exporters and importers.
The fact that the ESGC has a narrow mandate of providing hedging services provides a much stronger political economy rationale in the international context, and is much less susceptible to accusations of exchange rate manipulation through intervention. This advantage distinguishes the ESGC from the current Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF) of the Korean government, which is designed specifically for intervention purposes to smooth out exchange rate movements.
The ESGC has another advantage over the current Exchange Equalization Fund (EEF) from a political economy perspective, this time viewed from the domestic political context. The current EEF has both dollar-denominated and won-denominated accounts, and are used for intervention purposes. Since the objective is to smooth out exchange rate movements, the EEF can accumulate substantial gains or losses. From a domestic political economy perspective, the won-denominated gains and losses can be a sensitive political issue. During a time of sustained Korean won appreciation, the market intervention to slow the appreciation of the won will result in substantial marked-to-market losses in Korean won terms. Such losses can sometimes be portrayed in the media as reckless gambling by the government and the central bank at the expense of the national budget.
Such criticisms are not confined to Korea, as we have seen recently in the case of Switzerland and the Swiss policy of pegging the Swiss Franc to the euro.
The advantage of the ESGC is that it is designed to be perfectly hedged, so that there are no value gains or losses. The fact that it is valued in US dollars is crucial for this political economy advantage.
Not only is the ESGC relatively free from political economy pressures, it would be possible to construct a highly effective political economy case to highlight the many benefits that the ESGC can provide to the small and medium sized enterprise (SME) sector in Korea. The combination of lending for working capital financing as well as hedging services that are accessible to the small and medium sized (SME) firm sector would be highly beneficial to small exporters, and thereby level the playing field vis-à-vis the large firms in Korea. In this respect, the ESGC would chime in well with current consensus in policy circles on the desirability of leveling of the playing field between small and large firms by reducing the competitive disadvantage of small firms.
In this paper, we have examined the rationale for an institution (the ESGC) that can provide the public good of permitting economic entities to hedge their currency exposure while minimizing harmful spillover effects of their hedging activities for systemic stability as a whole. We saw that three features of the ESGC enable such a role. First, it is fully equity-financed, rather than debt-financed like a bank. Second, its valuation gains and losses are evaluated in US dollars, rather than in Korean won. Third, the ESGC is allowed to hold a portfolio of both US dollar-denominated and Korean won-denominated assets.
These three features allow the ESGC to maintain a fully hedged position in the face of currency movements by switching between assets in different currencies while balance sheet size is fixed. This is in contrast to banks, who hedge their currency exposure by expanding the balance sheet by taking on more short-term dollar denominated debt. The hedging operations of the ESGC are very simple one-off transactions, rather than involving dynamic hedging techniques.
As well as systemic stability, we have discussed the potential political economy advantages of such an institution, both domestically and internationally.
As stated at the outset, our study is intended as a contribution to discussions about policies toward longer-term financial resilience, rather than about short-term crisis management policies in the light of current financial developments. More detailed research and study on feasibility of the ESGC would be needed before it can be put in place.
In particular, there are legitimate concerns on the potential impact of the ESGC on the liquidity and smooth functioning of forward and swap markets and the impact on the business models of existing financial institutions that currently operate in these markets.
In addition, there are also legitimate concerns on how equity capital of the ESGC may be financed. More in depth study would be necessary along all these fronts. 
